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THE SALE OF COLLATERAL SECURITY BY THE
PLEDGEE THEREOF AFTER THE INTERVENTION OF THE BANKRUPTCY OF
THE PLEDGOR
By RICHARD ROBINSON MCGINNIS*

The more frequent occurrence of the necessity, because of depressed economic conditions, for lenders of money to realize upon
security pledged by the borrower to secure the payment of the
loan has revived interest among the profession in several questions of vital interest and great practical importance. Whether
this necessity presently increases or decreases, questions of this
nature sufficient to produce considerable litigation and controversy have already arisen.
Among these questions the one now considered has given rise
to numerous suits attended with considerable delay and expense
in connection with the satisfaction of the indebtedness, and in
some, if not in fact in many, instances, the unsatisfactory condition of the law has already resulted, and, if permitted to continue, will further result, in large financial loss to both the
lender-pledgee and the borrower-pledgor. Banks have been
advised following a recent decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States' that sales of securities pledged to them to secure
their loans, the loan being overdue and the borrower in default,
could not be made by them without the permission and perhaps
except under the direction of the Bankruptcy Courts. Although
arising on a creditor's bill in equity and not in a bankruptcy
proceeding, the opinion of Judge Lindley in the now famous In*Of the Evansville Bar.
I In re Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co. (Feb. 24, 1931), 282 U. S.

734, 75 L. ed. 645.
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sull cases,2 in which some of the recent bankruptcy cases are
discussed and cited, and the reversal of Judge Lindley's decision
by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 3 on the
question of the jurisdiction of the Court over the securities
pledged without a determination of the merits of the fundamental question here considered, have given rise to considerable doubt in the minds of lawyers as to the present condition
of the law and an equal amount of speculation as to what the
law ultimately will be in the premises. And, generally, uncertainty and doubt as to the rights of the lender of money who,
having taken a pledge of sufficient securities, thought himself or
itself secure, notwithstanding the institution of insolvency proceedings by the pledgor or the pledgor's other creditors, have
been widely expressed and have muddled the opinions of legal
counsellors accustomed to frequent dealing with problems of
that nature to such an extent that their opinions are of but little
value to the troubled banker or other lender of money confronted
with the necessity of coming to an immediate decision as to what
action to pursue, following the hopeless default of the borrower,
in the best interests of himself or his institution and its customers. While these doubts, uncertainties and opinions, it is
submitted, have been expressed and given as much perhaps by a
subconscious consideration, or a feeling, of what sometimes appears, at first blush, to be the "equities" of the case when a
pledgor is about to be "sold out," as from any too great uncertainty as to the state of the law in the premises, an examination
of the opinions of the Courts dealing with this problem reveal
a wide difference of opinion as to the proper principles which
should underlie a decision on this question, so that what will be
the ultimate decision of the Courts, if such has not already been
reached, can now be but little more than a guess. Even the most
cursory review of the situation and examination of the opinions
of the Courts in those cases in which the Courts have spoken
upon the question is convincing of the urgent desirability of a
speedy settlement of the law on the point or a general recognition that the law is already settled, if indeed that be true.
Briefly stated, the question is: The indebtedness being overdue and the obligor in default, has the pledgee of securities
2 Cherry v. Insull Utility Investments, Inc., Schoeneman v. Corporation
Securities Co. (May 28, 1932), 58 F. 2d 1022.
3 Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Fentriss, et al., and five other cases
(Oct. 17, 1932), 61 F. 2d 329.
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pledged to secure the debt the absolute right to sell the securities
after the intervention of the bankruptcy of the obligor-pledgor
without the permission or consent of the Bankruptcy Court so
long as he does so pursuant to the contract or agreement of
pledge and in strict conformity to its terms ?4 Or, to put it in
another way, has a Court of Bankruptcy the authority to interfere in any manner with such a sale by the pledgee or to compel
the pledgee to refrain from realization upon the security until
the Bankruptcy Court gives its consent to the sale?
Cases in which, in connection with the sale, fraud or oppression of the pledgor exist or are made to appear are not within
the scope of his discussion and are not considered.
It should be stated at the outset that the security referred to
throughout these observations is to be understood as being limited to collateral securities in the signification in which those
words are commonly used in the banking and commercial world,
such as stocks, bonds, insurance policies, promissory notes and
other choses in action and tangible personal property of similar
kind and character and similarly evidenced. For the purposes
of this discussion no difference between these different kinds of
collateral securities will be noticed, for it is submitted that the
same legal principles and considerations apply to all of them and
that no difference in these principles and considerations has ever
been or can validly be made on account of a difference in the
nature of the personalty constituting the pledged security. The
foreclosure of mortgages and the realization by a lender-mortgagee upon real estate security in the event of bankruptcy will,
however, be considered in so far as a consideration thereof is
4 The necessity for an exact compliance by the pledgee with a contract
or agreement of pledge has been illustrated in a recent Indiana case. In
Eppert v. Lowish (1930), 91 Ind. App. 231, 168 N. E. 616, it was held that
even though the pledge agreement authorized a sale of bonds by a pledgee
"at public or private sale without advertising the same, or demanding payment or giving notice," the only provision for a public sale by the pledgee
was "without advertisement" and the pledgee having elected to sell at pub-

lic sale after giving a notice (which the Court said was not within the
power given the pledgee by the pledge agreement) and having, therefore,

elected to sell at public sale with public notice and the notice actually given
by the pledgee having been, in the opinion of the Court, insufficient, the

two paragraphs of complaint stated a cause of action for conversion and
the Court below erred in overruling demurrers to them. In its opinion the
Court expressly stated that the averments of fraud appearing in the first
paragraph of complaint were being disregarded by it.

ing denied, 91 Ind. App. 238, 169 N. E. 884.)

(Petition for rehear-
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helpful or of importance in connection with a thorough discussion of the problem at hand. It having been stated by one
learned District Judge in a case arising on a creditor's bill in
equity for the appointment of receivers and the preservation
of a corporation's property 5 that "no good reason appears why
there should be any difference in principle in the power of the
Court to restrain action by a court or a party from foreclosure
of a lien upon realty without consent of Court and that to restrain sale of securities whose situs is within the Court's jurisdiction," the importance of a consideration of such cases is apparent. In point of fact, an inquiry as to whether there is any
distinction between cases of the foreclosure of real estate security and cases of the sale of collateral securities is of the essence
in any examination of this problem. The advice of counsel to
holders of collateral securities that they cannot sell such security without the permission of the Bankruptcy Court in view
of the decision in In re Isaacs v. Hobbs, etc., supra, is of necessity predicated upon there being no such distinction at all.
In the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (U. S. C. Title 11)6 is to be
found whatever power and authority there may be, if there be
any, in the courts of bankruptcy to prevent such sales of collateral security by a pledgee.
No provision in express terms granting such power or authority to such courts is contained in the Act. Section 2 thereof
(U. S. C. Title 11, Sec. 11) provides "That the courts of bankruptcy as hereinbefore defined . . . are hereby made courts of
bankruptcy and are hereby invested . . . with such jurisdiction
at law and in equity as will enable them to exercise original jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings . . . to . . . (15) make
such orders, issue such process and enter such judgment in addition to those specifically provided for as may be necessary for
the enforcement of the provisions of this act. . . . Nothing in
this section contained shall be construed to deprive a court of
bankruptcy of any power it would possess were certain specific
powers not herein enumerated. (As amended by Acts of February 5, 1903, and June 25, 1910.)" Does this section of the
Act invest bankruptcy courts with such power and authority?
5 Lindley, District Judge, in the Insull cases, supra.
6 No provisions relating to the problem here discussed have been included in any of the acts amendatory of said Act, namely- the Acts of
February 5, 1903, June 15, 1906, June 25, 1910, March 2, 1917, January 7,
1922, May 27, 1926, February 11, 1932, or March 3, 1933.

SALE OF COLLATERAL SECURITY

It has been suggested that 'this section, standing alone, gives
bankruptcy courts such power and authority. It is submitted
that a contention that this section of the Act confers any such
power or authority is untenable. The power to enforce obedience
to its lawful orders is inherent in every court. This provision
of the Act is simply declaratory of that power. Having been
given power to make orders necessary to carry out the provisions of the bankruptcy laws, the courts of necessity must possess the power to enforce such orders. The declaration of this
power by the Congress is the full intendment of this section. If
the court has the power to make an order enjoining, let us say
(an application to the Bankruptcy Court for a restraining order
or an injunction is, in the nature of the case, the way in which
the question has most frequently arisen and will most frequently
arise) a sale by the pledgee of collateral security after the intervention of bankruptcy, it of course has the power to enforce it.
But whether the power to make such an order, or any order
interfering in any way with such sale, is possessed by the bankruptcy courts is another matter and we must look elsewhere in
the Act than to this section to find it. Is there any provision of
the Act which by implication or upon reasonable construction
can be said to give the bankruptcy courts power to make a lawful
order to this effect?
An examination of the Act reveals no provision prohibiting,
either by implication or upon a reasonable construction thereof,
the sale by a pledgee of collateral security held by the pledgee
under a valid7 agreement of pledge and pursuant to its terms.
It would seem that the pledge itself, together with the lien
thereof, is expressly recognized, protected and preserved by the
Act. Section 67d of the Act (U. S. C. Title 11, Sec. 107d) provides:
"Liens given or accepted in good faith and not in contemplation of, or in fraud upon, this act, and for a present consideration, which have been recorded according to law, if record
7 Any question of the validity of the contract or agreement of pledge is
of course not within the scope of this discussion and the validity of the
contract or agreement of pledge is throughout this discussion assumed. It
may be said in passing that the contract or agreement of pledge and the
rights of the respective parties thereto are governed by the laws of the
state where the same is made. Hiscock v. The Varick Bank, (1907) 206

U. S. 28, 51 L. ed. 945.
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thereof was necessary in order to impart notice, shall, to the
extent of such present consideration only not be affected by the
act."
That pledges of collateral security are such liens as receive
the recognition of this provision and come within its protection,
seems to be clearly settled. Even those courts which refuse to
permit the sale except with their permission do not attempt to
declare that such pledges and the liens thereof do not fall within
this provision. They concede that this is the case, but assert
that there is a difference between the pledgee's substantive right
on the one hand and his remedy on the other, and that, while the
former is recognized and protected by the Act, the latter must be
pursued and enforced only with the permission of the court of
bankruptcy.
That pledges of collateral securities come within this provision of the Act is obviously sound. Such pledges are of course
liens upon the security and liens are the subject matter of section 67d. It is of importance to note the large proportion that
pledges of personal property bear to the total number and
amount of liens in existence today, amounting into the billions
of dollars.8 It was the purpose and intendment of the Congress
in enacting a national insolvency law to preserve rather than destroy any of the rights or advantages enjoyed by creditors under
the laws of the states unless the same were repugnant to some
specific provision of the Bankruptcy Act. This provision (Sec.
67d) of the Act is in line with this spirit of the Act and in harmony with other provisions of the Act which evidence and carry
into effect this purpose and intendment of the legislature. For
example, under Sections 70a of the Act (U. S. C. Title 11, Sec.
ll0a) it has been held that the trustee in bankruptcy takes no
better title than the bankrupt has as to bona fide lienors, and
under that provision (Sec. 70e, U. S. C. Title 11, 110e) which
gives the trustee power to avoid any transfer, including liens
fraudulent as to creditors, all bona fide transactions are recognized and protected. A clear statement of this spirit and inten8 As of June 30, 1933, the loans, unsecured and secured by all forms of
security, of the 4,902 national banking associations existing in the United

States on that date totalled $8,116,972,000.00. While exact figures are not
available at the present time, at least 50% of this amount is secured by
collateral securities of the kind considered in this discussion, according to
a conservative estimate.
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tion of the Bankruptcy Act is found in In re Mertens, et al.
(1906) (C. C. A. 2d) 144 Fed. 818, which case is affirmed by the
Supreme Court in Hiscock v. The Varick Bank (1907), 206 U. S.
28, 51 L. ed. 945:
"That Congress did not intend that lienors or pledgees should
be prejudiced in enforcing their rights by the commencement of
the proceedings in bankruptcy is indicated by the change made
in the present Act with respect to the proof of claims by secured
creditors. By the former Act it was provided that a secured
creditor should be admitted as a creditor only for the balance of
his debt after deducting the value of the pledged property ascertained by an agreement between him and the assignee in bankruptcy, or by a sale under the direction of the Court. Under that
provision, if a pledgee sold the pledged property prior to the
appointment of the assignee without the permission of the Court,
he was precluded from proving his claim or from obtaining any
share of tht bankrupt's estate to which he otherwise would have
been entitled. The present Act provides that the value of his
security may be determined, among other methods, by converting
it into money pursuant to his contract rights, and thus after he
has enforced it as the contract with the debtor allowed, he is
permitted to prove the unsatisfied balance of his claim."
The pledge itself being recognized and protected and preserved from destruction by this provision of the law in the event
of the bankruptcy of the pledgor, what are the provisions of the
Act and what have been the holdings of the bankruptcy courts
upon the question: Can the holder of such a lien proceed to enforce his lien by a sale of the pledged securities without the consent of the bankruptcy court and apart from the direction and
superintendence of that court?
Just as Section 67d deals with the preservation of the pledge
itself and the lien thereof, so another section of the Act deals
with the question of the conversion of securities into money and
the ascertainment of their value. Section 5Th (U. S. C. Title 11,
Sec. 93h) provides:
"The value of securities held by secured creditors shall be determined by conyerting the same into money according to the
terms of the agreement pursuant to which such securities were
delivered to such creditors or by such creditors and trustee by
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agreement, arbitration, compromise or litigation, as the Court
may direct, and the amount of such value shall be credited upon
such claims and a dividend shall be paid only upon the unpaid
balance."
It would seem that the clear language of this section gives to
the pledgee the right to convert the pledged securities into money
according to the terms of the contract or agreement of pledge.
The two methods of determining the value of securities set out
in this section are connected only by the word "or." This is in
the disjunctive, and to read the statute as if the word "and"
occupied the place of the word "or" and in such a way as to
say that it means that, while the right to convert the securities
into money according to the agreement pursuant to which they
were delivered to the pledgee is recognized, this must also be
done "by agreement, arbitration, compromise or litigation, as the
Court may direct" would be to misread the language of the act
and to pervert its clear purpose and meaning.
On this matter Remington in his treatise on Bankruptcy, 3rd
Ed., Vol. 2, Sec. 923, says:
"If the agreement under which the securities were delivered
provides the method for converting them into money, the creditor holding the security has the right to have the security converted into money according to such method, providing he follows such method. (Cases cited)."
In In re Mertens, supra, the Court said, in considering this
matter:
"Section 57, subdivision h, prescribes several modes of valuation, and the one referred to is exclusive of the others and is
superfluous and useless unless it is intended to authorize the creditor, without interference by the trustee or the court, to value
his own security, provided he turns it into money, 'according
to the terms of the agreement pursuant to which' it was delivered to him."
And, in view of the following language of the Supreme Court
of the United States construing this section (57h) in Hiscock v.
The Varick Bank (1907), 206 U. S. 28, 51 L. ed. 945: "The
Court was by this subdivision empowered to direct a disposition
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of the pledge, or the ascertainment of its value, where the parties had failed to do so by their own agreement. It is only
when the securities have not been disposed of by the creditor in
accordance with his contract that the Court may direct what
shall be done in the premises," it is submitted for consideration
whether any interference by a court of bankruptcy with a sale
by a pledgee of collateral security pursuant to the contract or
agreement of pledge and in strict conformity to its terms, in the
absence of course of any fraud or oppression, is not a direct contravention of this provision of the bankruptcy law.
To examine critically all of the cases bearing upon the question would require more time and space than is permitted, but
in the recently decided cases hereinafter considered most of the
cases dealing with the problem have been analyzed or at least
cited.
Two lines of cases each reaching a diametrically opposite result seem to constitute the case-book authorities upon the question under consideration. An examination and analysis of these
cases leads one to a consideration of whether the difference in
the result obtained is not occasioned by a difference of opinion
on the bench as to these underlying propositions or problems,
which, broadly stated, are (1) whether there is or should be any
valid distinction in the case of a pledge of collateral securities
between the substantive right of the pledgee and his remedy;
and (2) whether any particular result should be reached in the
case of a pledge of collateral securities because of the nature of
such property or the nature and purpose of such pledges and the
liens thereof and their position and usage in the present business
world. This statement of the underlying considerations concerning which there is a contrariety of opinion resulting in conflict in the decisions is not made either as an accurate statement
of the exact reasons given by the courts or as a summary statement of the entire problem, but rather as a general guide that
may or may not be helpful in a critical examination of the cases
themselves.
In Hiscock v. The Varick Bank, supra, certain policies of life
insurance had been assigned to the bank as collateral security.
In upholding the right of the bank to sell the policies Mr. Chief
Justice Fuller, speaking for the Court, said:
"When the petition in the present case was filed the bank had
a valid lien upon these policies for the payment of its debt. The
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contracts under which they were pledged were valid and enforceable under the laws of New York, where the debt was incurred
and the lien created. The bankruptcy act did not attempt, by
any of its provisions, to deprive a lienor of any remedy which
the law of the state vested him with; on the other hand, it provided, Sec. 67d: 'Liens given or accepted in good faith and not
in contemplation of, or in fraud upon, this act, and for a present consideration, which have been recorded according to law, if
record thereof was necessary in order to impart notice, shall
not be affected by this act.'"
This case, it would seem, is clear authority for the proposition that a pledgee has the absolute right to sell collateral security pursuant to the contract or agreement of pledge and in conformity with the terms thereof without the consent of the Bankruptcy Court or under the direction of that Court, in the absence of fraud or oppression. No modification of this decision of
the Supreme Court appears to have been made by that tribunal
and it is perhaps not too much to say that this case states the law
controlling the problem considered.
Some of the more important other cases commonly cited as
authority for the existence of the pledgee's right of independent
sale it may be profitable to briefly refer to. The most recent adjudication in the Circuit Courts of Appeal supporting the right
is In re Hudson River Navigation Corp., Ex Parte Ten Eyck,
Appeal of Chase National Bank (C. C. A. 2d) (April 4, 1932),
57 F. 2d 175. After considering the nature of the pledgee's interest in the securities the Court said:
"It seems unnecessary to refine too far; in substance entire
control over the obligation passes to the pledgee, who certainly
gets possession of the documents, without which, so long as the
pledgee acts -in accord with the agreement, the pledgor cannot
assert any rights as obligee. For practical purposes the pledgee
has therefore immediate dominion as between the two, and with
it goes the power to resist any action by the bankruptcy court,
which must be founded on the fact that the bankrupt had such
dominion when the petition was filed. This was implicit in our
ruling in In re Mertens, 144 F. 818, and we directly held so in
In re Mayer, 157 F. 836; since when it has been generally understood that bankruptcy does not touch the power of a pledgee of
shares of stock to close out his collateral. Nothing would be
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more disturbing to transactions of the kind than a doubt thrown
upon that ruling. Millions of dollars are daily lent upon like collateral, which fluctuate from hour to hour; unless the pledgee
is free to choose his time to sell, his security may disappear. The
same is not indeed true of shares like those at bar, or of notes,
neither of which vary rapidly in value; but the same legal reasons exist as to them also. The pledgee, having taken possession
of the documents, supposes himself for just that reason to be
the sole judge of his necessities and lends on that understanding.
So long as he keeps within the terms of the agreement, he need
not concern himself with the pledgor's fate, or that of his creditors, who must stand in his shoes."
This was a case in which the bankrupt had pledged, for loans
made by it, together with other collateral,, two notes of the bankrupt company secured by a chattel mortgage upon a steel
steamer. The agreement of pledge assigned these securities to
the bank and provided that it might sell them without notice
upon default, as it was proposing to do. The trustee in applying
for an order enjoining the proposed sale did not allege that the
pledge was invalid or that the bank was not proceeding in accord
with the agreement, but simply that the sale at that time would
result in great sacrifice of the collateral which was amply sufficient to protect the loans, that some of the securities were essential to the conduct of the bankrupt's business and that a reorganization of the bankrupt concern was in contemplation.
Whatever one's opinion as to the correctness of the Court's
decision, the common-sense and sound reasoning of the opinion,
which does not seem during the past year and a half to have been
disturbed or distinguished on any ground, supplies strong support for the result reached by the Court. 9
In In re Ironclad Mfg. Co. (C. C. A. 2d) (1912), 192 F. 318,
the same Circuit Court of Appeals, being presented with the
petition of an unsecured creditor, representing half of all the
creditors, alleging that a receiver in bankruptcy had been appointed, that the bankrupt company had created a bond issue and
that certain banks holding the bonds as collateral security were
taking steps to sell the same and that a restraining order should
be issued effective for sixty days after the election of a trustee
9 It does not appear that a petition for a Writ of Certiorari was ever
passed upon by the Supreme Court in this case, and, presumably, no such

petition was filed.
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in order that irretrievable loss to the unsecured creditors of the
bankrupt estate might be prevented, denied the petition on the
authority of Jerome v. McCarter, (1877) 94 U. S. 734, 24 L. ed.
136.
Jerome v. McCarter is a case involving a mortgage covering
a canal and certain franchises, as well as certain bodies of land,
supporting certain bonds which had been issued and were outstanding. A detailed examination of this case is not permitted
because of lack of time and space, but the following language
of the Court with reference to the bonds of the bankrupt concern
should be noted:
"There is some proof that, when the company became bankrupt some of the bonds were held as collaterals for loans made
to the company smaller in amount than the bonds pledged. The
bonds were subsequently sold by the pledgee and the present
holders own them by absolute right. The position that the
pledgees could not sell the pledge after the adjudication in bankruptcy is quite untenable. It is sustained by nothing in the
Bankruptcy Act. The bonds were negotiable instruments. They
passed by delivery and even were there no expressed stipulation
in the contracts of pledge that the pledgee might sell on the
default of the pledgor, such a right is presumable from the nature of the transaction. Certainly the Bankruptcy Act has taken
away no right from a pledgee secured to him by his contract."
The statements of the leading text writers on the subject under immediate consideration are contained in a footnote. 10
10 "Pledgees and other lienholders in possession of securities upon property of the bankrupt estate will not be enjoined from selling their securities
in accordance with the contract unless there be fraud or oppression. In re
Mayer, Leslie v. Bayles, 19 A. B. R. 356, 157 Fed. 836 (C. C. A. N. Y.).

Compare In re Searles, 29 A. B. R. 635, 200 Fed. 893 (D. C. N. Y.); In re
Hasie, 30 A. B. R. 83, 206 Fed. 789 (D. C. Tex.); Griffin v. Smith, 41 A. B.
R. 354, 177 Cal. 481, 171 Pac. 92.

Contra, inferentially, In re Cobb, 3 A.

B. R. 129, 96 Fed. 821 (D. C. N. Car.) wherein the Court seems to consider
that pledgees in possession at the time of bankruptcy must nevertheless submit their securities to the Bankruptcy Court. This case was decided, it must
be remembered, before the decision of the U. S. Supreme Court in Bardes

v. Bank, 178 U. S. 524, 44 L. ed. 1175, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1000, 4 A. B. R.
163."
Remington on Bankruptcy, 3d Ed., Vol. 5, Sec. 2510.
Again this same authority says: "It is not necessary to ask the direc-
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Notwithstanding these decisions above cited, is a lawyer safe
in advising his client that he may sell the collateral security held
by him, so long as he does so pursuant to the valid contract or
agreement by which he holds the same and in strict conformity
to its terms, after a petition in bankruptcy has been filed by or
against the pledgor?
It is not too much to say that perhaps greater interests have
been affected by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in In re Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co. (Feb. 24, 1931),
282 U. S. 734, 75 L. ed. 645, than by any decision of that Court
in recent years.1
tion or permission of the court to realize on the security where it is realized
on according to the terms of the contract."
Remington on Bankruptcy, 3d Ed., Vol. 2, Sec. 923.
Collier in his work on Bankruptcy, Collier on Bankruptcy, 13th Ed.,
Vol. 1, p. 110, says: "A bankruptcy court may not restrain a sale by the
pledgee of property held by him under a valid agreement of pledge by the
bankrupt and pursuant to its terms. Matter of Mayer (C. C. A. 2d Cir.),
19 Am. B. R. 356, 156 Fed. 432." (Note: Under this statement the author
in the supplement to his 13th Edition of 1931 and 1932 cites Matter of
Purkett-Douglas & Co. (D. C. Cal.), 17 Am. B. R. (N. S.) 568, 50 F. 2d, 435,
as authority for the proposition that a bankruptcy court may enjoin sale of
securities belonging to the bankrupt and pledged as security for payment
of a note until adverse claims of the parties can be adjudicated in a plenary
suit. This case will be considered infra.) "Such a pledge and the rights
of the parties thereto are governed by the law of the state where made,
Hiscock v. Varick Bank, 206 U. S. 268, 18 Am. B. R. 1, and being valid
and not forbidden by any provision of the bankruptcy act, cannot be interfered with by the court."
11 The case has attracted great attention among the profession. The
decision of the Court even within the limits of its holding upon the facts
of the case has been adversely criticized. It is stated with alarm by some
that it has apparently changed the law relative to the obtaining of the
consent of the bankruptcy courts to bring proceedings to foreclose a mortgage in a state court after the adjudication. It is stated by others that
the Court's decision is in harmony with the past decisions and with statutory authority although it does perhaps interpret the Act differently and
more closely follow the Act.
It is contended on the one hand that the decision of the Court to the
effect that the consent of the Bankruptcy Court must first be had before a
state or federal court (other than the bankruptcy court) has jurisdiction,
after an adjudication, to deal with the bankrupt's real estate or liens
thereon, implies that if such consent be obtained, such jurisdiction in the
state or other federal court would exist and is therefore inconsistent with
the statement of Mr. Justice Roberts in the opinion "Indeed a court of
bankruptcy itself is powerless to surrender its control of the administration of the estate." On the other hand it is pointed out that this state-
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In this case one Henrietta A. Cunningham, who owned real
estate in both Texas and Arkansas, had mortgaged certain of the
land in Arkansas to secure a note. The note and mortgage were
held by appellee. She filed a petition in bankruptcy in Texas
and was duly adjudged a bankrupt. Isaacs was elected trustee
and qualified. Thereafter the appellee instituted foreclosure
proceedings in a state court in Arkansas to foreclose said mortgage, named the trustee as a party defendant, recited the bankruptcy proceedings and stated that it had not filed its secured
note as a claim therein. Isaacs appeared in the state court for
the purpose of petitioning for a removal of the cause to the
U. S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas. After
the removal the trustee filed an answer, in which he set up, inter
alia, his right and title as trustee, his lack of information as to
the execution of the note and mortgage, and the fact that the
land had been scheduled in the Texas District Court as an asset
of the bankrupt. He further averred that as trustee he had
taken and then held peaceable possession of the land; that there
was an equity in the same above the mortgage debt; that a sale
in foreclosure would prejudice the rights of general creditors;
that he required time for investigation as to the most favorable
method of sale; that neither he nor the Bankruptcy Court had
ment occurs in the concluding paragraph of the opinion and that in that
concluding paragraph the Court was simply disposing of the contention
of the plaintiff (the losing party on the appeal) that the trustee by appearing in the foreclosure proceeding in the other Federal Court had waived
any question of jurisdiction, and that if the whole opinion is considered in
its entirety the decision simply pronounces a well established rule of bankruptcy law, namely, that the filing of a petition in bankruptcy is a caveat
to the world and that thereafter no other court can interfere with its jurisdiction.
In view of the conflict in the interpretation of the Court's opinion and
the importance of the question, it has already been suggested that an
amendment to the Bankruptcy Act is desirable. The suggestion is that
Section 2, defining the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts, should be amended
by adding a new subdivision (21) authorizing courts of bankruptcy to permit the foreclosure of mortgages and other liens in other courts during the
pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings, whenever the bankruptcy court is
convinced that there is no equity for the bankrupt estate or where the
property is burdensome. Section 23, which defines the jurisdiction of the
U. S. and State courts, could be also amended by adding similar provisions.
(Mr. Max Isaac, in 7 Am. B. Review, 361.) Sed query, since the principal
case, although it uses very broad language, deals solely with the foreclosure of mortgages on real estate, whether Mr. Isaac's suggestion that "other
liens" need to be included in the amendment is necessary.
In the same article Mr. Isaac adds that there is no statutory justifica-
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consented to the foreclosure of the mortgage; that the Bankruptcy Court had entered an order authorizing him to sell the
land; that the Court had exclusive jurisdiction to ascertain the
facts and administer the property; that the Federal District
Court in Arkansas could proceed no further than to ascertain the
interests of the defendant, the validity of the mortgage debt and
the amount of the debt. The answer prayed that after these preliminary steps the court should refuse an order of sale, because
of its want of jurisdiction to enter one. On motion of the plaintiff the court struck out so much of the answer as sought to delay
judgment and sale, and entered on the pleadings, a decree of
foreclosure and sale containing a proviso that if there should be
any surplus of purchase-money over the amount of the judgment, interest and costs, the same should be paid to the trustee.
The case was taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 8th
Circuit and that Court certified up to the Supreme Court the
following question: "After the Bankruptcy Court has acquired
jurisdiction of the estate of the bankrupt and the referee therein
has entered an order requiring sale by the trustee of all the property of the bankrupt but before the trustee has taken any steps
to sell land (part of such estate) entirely located in another
judicial district, can a suit to foreclose a valid mortgage thereon
tion for the action of the bankruptcy court in "relieving the situation by
permitting foreclosures in state courts." In view of Mr. Isaac's interpretation of the opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts, the language of the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit in a decision handed down since the decision
in the principal case, in which the Circuit Court of Appeals denied a leave
to appeal from an order of the District Court granting such permission,
should be noted. That Court said: "The application for leave to appeal is
based upon the claim that the District Court has no power, to oust itself
from jurisdiction over property of an estate in bankruptcy and after jurisdiction is once obtained by the court it is exclusive. Counsel argues that
in view of the recent decision in Isaacs as Trustee v. Hobbs Tie & Timber
Co. (75 L. ed. 332), March, 1931, Am. B. Rev. 241, the court cannot permit
a foreclosure in the State Supreme Court. Justice Roberts, writing in that
case, expressly held that after the bankruptcy court has acquired jurisdiction of the estate, other courts are without jurisdiction 'save by consent of
the bankruptcy court.' In the Isaacs case, the foreclosure was instituted
without application to the bankruptcy court in the district having jurisdiction of the bankruptcy proceeding. At bar the mortgagee proceeded to
obtain consent of the bankruptcy court, in the Southern District, having
jurisdiction of the above named bankrupt and upon satisfying the Court
it obtained consent to proceed with the foreclosure in the State Supreme
Court. This we think is within the rule announced in Isaacs v. Hobbs, etc.,
supra." In re Schulte-United, Inc., Bkpt. (April 22, 1931), 49 F. 2d. 264.
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and an order of sale thereunder be made over the objection of
the trustee by the court of the latter District?" The decision of
the Supreme Court was that the judgment of the District Court
be reversed and the cause remanded for further procedings in
accordance with the Court's opinion.
This case would seem to be clear authority for the proposition
that a mortgagee of the real estate cannot foreclose his mortgage
without the permission of the bankruptcy court, the foreclosure
suit having
been instituted after the date of the fling of the peti2

tion.1 and 13

12 It is of importance to note that if the foreclosure suit is brought
before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy the law is definitely settled
that the foreclosure suit may proceed and the bankruptcy court will not
interfere. tyster v. Gaff (1876) 91 U. S. 521, 23 L. ed. 403, is a direct
authority for the proposition that a foreclosure suit instituted before the
date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy will not be interfered with.
Straton v. Andy New (April 20, 1931), 285 U. S. 318, 75 L. ed. 1060,
decided after In re Isaacs v. Hobbs, etc., supra, is the latest authority for
this proposition. In this case the court in refusing to enjoin the prosecution in a state court of a creditor's bill filed prior (5Y months) to the
filing of the bankruptcy petition seeking an order to sell certain real estate
of the bankrupt upon which the creditor had a lien by virtue of a judgment obtained and entered more than four months (sixteen months) before
the filing of the bankruptcy petition, said: "Most of the cases cited by
the appellees to the effect that the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings
confers on the district court jurisdiction to enjoin pending suits in state
courts deal with the situation where a lien was acquired within four
months of the filing of the petition, or where, after the filing of the petition an action was begun to enforce a lien valid in bankruptcy. As heretofore noted, there are a few cases which have held that the bankruptcy court
may enjoin proceedings, brought prior to the filing of the petition, to enforce valid liens which are more than four months old at the date of
bankruptcy; but these cases are contrary to the decision of this Court and
to the great weight of federal authority." The Supreme Court's decision
in this case, written by Mr. Justice Roberts, who also wrote the opinion
in In re Isaacs v. Hobbs, etc., supra, indicates that Isaacs v. Hobbs, etc.,
supra, will be limited in its application to its factual situation, at least in
some particulars.
Does not Straton v. New, supra, show that In re Isaacs v. Hobbs, supra,
would not have been decided as it was had the creditor or the Court in
which he had instituted the suit to foreclose his lien taken possession of the
mortgaged property prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy?
See New Albany Nat. Bank v. Brown (1916), 63 Ind. App. 391, 114
N. E. 486, in which case the Court said: "As an abstract proposition of
law possession is the essence of pledge . ."
13 It apparently makes no difference in which form the question arises,
that is, whether upon an application for an injunction by the officers of
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Does this case have any applicability to the question here considered? Could it properly be cited by a court upon enjoining
such a sale of collateral securities as is now under discussion as
authority for its action in so doing?
Thus far in this discussion an attempt has been made simply
to state the opinions and the decisions of the courts with respect
to the problem without an attempt at critical analysis of their
reasoning or their policy. With the idea in mind that it is of the
greatest desirability to be able to reasonably anticipate the future opinions of the Courts on the point, an examination of some
of the underlying considerations in connection with this problem
may be helpful.
In the course of his opinion in the Insull cases, supra, Judge
Lindley said:
"The order entered does not contravene any vested right of
the pledgee. The rule established by statute in bankruptcy cases
to the effect that all liens in third parties are recognized and preserved is but declaratory of rights at common law and under the
Constitution. Consequently the same rule controls in receiverships in equity. But the rule does not require that the parties
shall be left to the same remedies as existed before the jurisdiction of the court attached. A particular form of remedy is not
within constitutional protection. (Cases cited.) . . . The determination of the question here involved does not affect in any
manner the right of the pledgees to seek relief in this court.
Here they may have enforced any right to which they may be
entitled under and by virtue of their contract of pledge. 'The
court and not the lienors is to decide' as to the mode of sale.
(Cases cited.) . . . It is insisted, however, that the court should
not restrain a sale of pledged property, and reliance is placed
upon In re Hudson River Nay. Corp. (C. C. A.), 57 F. 2d, 175,
decided recently by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 2d Cirthe bankruptcy court or, as In re Isaacs v. Hobbs, etc., supra, for Mr. Justice Roberts says: "Such injunctions are granted solely for the reason
that the Court in which foreclosure proceedings are instituted is without

jurisdiction after adjudication in bankruptcy to deal with the land or liens
upon it save by consent of the bankruptcy court. The appellant-trustee

might have instituted ancillary proceedings in the District Court for the
Western District of Arkansas and there obtained an injunction to restrain
the appellee from foreclosing its mortgage. There is no reason however
why he should not have followed the course here pursued of pleading the
adjudication in Texas in abatement of the foreclosure proceeding."
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cuit. If the opinion in that case cited is intended to announce the
rule that a court of equity may not under any circumstances
restrain foreclosures of liens on sales of pledged property, it is
at odds with Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., 282 U. S. 734,
51 S. Ct. 270, 75 L. ed. 645, and Straton v. New, 283 U. S.318,
51 S. Ct. 465, 75 L. ed. 1060."
Passing, without comment, the learned Judge's facile connection of equity cases with bankruptcy cases by stating that since
the bankruptcy statute preserving liens is but declaratory of the
common law and that "consequently the same rule controls in
receiverships in equity" and his easy manner of disposing of In
re Hudson River Nay. Corp., it is sufficient to observe that he
considers there to be a distinction in the case of collateral securities between the right of a pledgee of securities and his remedy, and that he does not draw a distinction between the case of
a mortgage of real estate and the case of a pledge of collateral
securities.
In re Purkett-Douglas & Co. (March 30, 1931) (D. C. So. D.
of Cal.), 50 F. 2d 435, the District Judge restrained the sale by
a pledgee of certain bonds pledged to secure the payment of a
promissory note, after differentiating from that case the cases
holding (which cases will be considered later in this discussion)
that the Bankruptcy Court cannot, where it lacked actual possession of the res, adjudicate in a summary proceeding the validity
of an adverse claim as to the pledged property, without the consent of the adverse party, and said: "What is here sought, and
what this Court has undertaken to accomplish, is to restrain the
sale of said securities by respondent until the adverse claims of
the respective parties can be adjudicated in a plenary suit before
the appropriate tribunal." The Court cites In re Jersey Island
Packing Co., 138 Fed. 625, which was a case involving only the
foreclosure of a mortgage on real estate, in which case it is said:
"The provision of the bankruptcy act that such a lien shall not be
affected by the bankruptcy proceeding has reference only to the
validity of the lienholder's contract. It does not have reference
to his remedy to enforce his right. The remedy may be altered
without impairing the obligation of his contract, so long as an
equally efficient and adequate remedy is substituted." In re
Jersey Island Packing Co. (which case will be considered later)
was decided in 1905 by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 9th
Circuit, and before the decision of the Supreme Court in His-
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cock v. The Varick Bank, supra. In re Purkett-Douglas & Co.,
it should be noted, is a case in which an adverse claim relative
to the pledged securities was asserted by the petitioner on the
ground that the transfer (pledging) of the security to the respondent was a usurious payment of interest on account of said
loan. It should be pointed out also that the petition alleged that
the respondent, unless restrained, would sell the collateral for
a sum grossly disproportionate to the true value thereof and
thereby would cause irreparable loss to the estate of petitioner
and great injury to the creditors of the petitioner. What is the
status of this District Court case as authority in a case where no
adverse claim to the pledged property is or can be asserted? If
it be claimed that it is an authority in support of the right of a
bankruptcy court, through its receiver, to enjoin the sale by a
pledgee of collateral securities under a valid pledge it is directly
contrary to the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Circuit embracing that District in International Banking Corp.
v. Lynch (1920), 269 Fed. 242. This case, International Banking Corp. v. Lynch, is a case where the pledgee after the appointment of a receiver for the pledgor's property and after an order
had been issued by the bankruptcy court restraining all persons
from interfering with the property of the pledgor-bankrupt in
the receiver's possession, sold the pledged property. In holding
that the sale was not a violation of this order the Court said:
"The receiver appointed in this suit had the undoubted right to
pay the indebtedness for which the stock was held as security
and thereupon to receive possession thereof, as the property of
the insolvent owner; but it is equally clear, without paying such
indebtedness he had no such right of possession. The stock remains subject to sale by its pledgee pursuant to the terms of

the pledge agreement."
In re Isaacs v. Hobbs, etc., supra, is a case of real estate and
real estate mortgages. It is fundamental that the aid of a court
must be obtained in connection with the realization upon such
liens. This is not true in the case of collateral securities, which
may simply be taken out of their place of safe-keeping and sold
with no more formality than is required in the contract or agreement of pledge. The jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court being
paramount, in a proper case, it is obviously sound that that jurisdiction should not be interfered with by another court. The doctrine of comity between courts, the obvious desirability of preventing conflict of jurisdiction, and the necessity of preserving
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a legal court's very existence by protecting its jurisdiction and
power as against other legal courts, alone would support such
a conclusion. The absolute necessity, in order to avoid hopeless
confusion, for a court to maintain its jurisdiction and power in
a case where it has paramount jurisdiction, or has first acquired
jurisdiction, as against another court having the same power to
enforce its decrees as the former court, is of course apparent.
It is submitted for consideration whether the imperative necessity for such a legal doctrine and state of affairs in a society
having more than one court having concurrent jurisdiction, or
rather power, in any given case, does not alone afford the basis
for the rule of In re Isaacs v. Hobbs, etc., supra, whether the
same is expressed and recognized or but subconsciously felt.
This case has been cited, however, as authority for the proposition that a sale by a pledgee of collateral security may be restrained by a court of bankruptcy in any case.
In In re Henry (June 10, 1931), 50 F. 2d 453, the pledgees
were restrained from selling certain investment securities
pledged to them for loans by the bankrupt by the District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Judge Dickinson said:
"We are not impressed with the objection to the exclusive control of the bankruptcy courts on the ground that the control given to the pledgee was given by contract and hence any interference with it by the bankruptcy court impairs the obligation of a
contract. If a bankruptcy court has no lawful power to do anything which impairs the obligation of contracts, there is very
little left which a bankruptcy court can do. We have nothing to
do with the doctrine of the inviolability of contracts. The whole
question is embraced in these fact situation propositions. The
loan for which the pledge was given must be paid; it cannot be
paid without a sale of the pledge. The sole question is whether
the bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction to make the sale
or whether in defiance of the bankruptcy court some other court
or the pledgee himself can sell. It is admitted that the case of
Isaacs, Trustee v. Hobbs, etc., rules that another court cannot
decree the sale of assets in the possession and under the control
of the bankruptcy court without the leave of the latter court.
The ruling in the cited case can be readily understood. Its propositions are very clearly stated. The only differences of opinion
are over the implications and whether the doctrine of that case
extends to another case in which the fact situation is different.
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The cited case was one of a pledge of land for the payment of a
loan with the right to sell the land pledged through the processes
of a court. After the land had become bankruptcy assets the
cited case rules that it could not without the leave of the bankruptcy court be sold by another court under the pledge.
"In the instant case there is a like pledge, not of land but of
personal property, and the pledgee has the right to sell not
merely through the processes of a court but to sell himself without recourse to any court.
"In the cited case it was ruled that the pledgee could not sell
the pledged land through an execution but that it could be sold
by a bankruptcy court (or by its leave). Should a like ruling
be made in the instant case? The learned referee thought that
under the cited case it should and so ordered. This is the order
under review.
"We are in full accord with the proposition that the possession
of the pledge cannot be disturbed by any summary action of the
bankruptcy court but the right of the pledgee is open to attack
inly by plenary suit. This, however, is not the question before us. The question is the quite different one of the right of
the pledgee to take the assets of the bankruptcy court out of
the control of the bankruptcy court by selling them. The power
to stop such sales is exercised daily by bankruptcy courts. Mortgagees to whom seized lands have been conveyed are so restrained; likewise judgment creditors who have taken lands on
execution; in like manner landlords who have distrained property for rent; plaintiffs in attachment in execution proceedings
are also so restrained. No such pledgees are permitted to enforce their pledges by sale. Is the pledgee under so-called collatteral loans an exception to the general rule? The only theory,
so far as we can discover, on which this case can be differentiated from that of other pledgees is that the collateral holder
is not a pledgee in the lien holder sense but is an owner. As he
is such owner the thing pledged is his and forms no part of the
bankruptcy assets or at the most the bankruptcy court does not
have possession but only the right to possession which can be
reduced to possession only by a plenary suit. 14 This theory is
14 Numerous decisions of the Supreme Court could be cited to the proposition that actual possession by the bankrupt court is the indispensable

condition of its exclusive and of its summary jurisdiction in cases of this
character. In Taubel, etc., v. Fox (1924), 264 U. S. 426, 68 L. ed. 770, Mr.

Justice Brandeis said:

"Wherever the bankrupt court had possession it
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provocative of discussion which has no end. The property here
is theoretically of the type known as choses in action. The
pledgee of bonds or of stocks holds possession of nothing except
the evidence of a debt due the pledgor or of his right to share in
assets of a corporation. A mortgagee is in form not a pledgee
but the owner of the land described in his mortgage subject to
a defeasance. All which is left to the mortgagor or owner is
the right of redemption. None the less the now accepted view
is that the mortgagee is a pledgee or lien holder. The ordinary
form of corporate bonds or certificates of stock, it is true, have
come to be regarded not as evidences of debt or of a share in
corporate assets but as in themselves property. Pledgees of
bonds or stocks are none the less pledgees with a right of lien.
This is the only real right they have. We see no difference in
this respect between them and the pledgees of land. We are
not unmindful of the difference between the possession of a
power and the propriety of its exercise. A bankruptcy court
is as much bound to have regard to the rights of pledgee creditors as of any other creditors and not to forget that the latter
may have priority of right. A pledgee, because of this, should
always be at liberty to apply to the court for leave to enforce
his pledge."
The foregoing opinion is cited at some length because of some
of the rather startling statements therein contained. No authorities except In re Isaacs v. Hobbs, etc., supra, are cited in the
course of the Court's remarks.
could, under the Act of 1898, as originally enacted, and can now determine
in a summary proceeding controversies involving substantial adverse claims
of title under subdivision 2 of Sec. 67, under subdivision b of Sec. 20 and
under subdivision 2 of Sec. 70. But in no case where it lacked possession,
could the bankrupt court, under the law as originally enacted, nor can it
now (without consent)

.

.

.

In this case the sheriff had, before the

filing of the petition in bankruptcy, taken exclusive possession and control
of the property; and he had retained such possession and control after
adjudication and the appointment of the trustees. The bankrupt court,
therefore, did not have actual possession of the res. The bankrupt court,
therefore, did not acquire jurisdiction over the controversy in summary
proceedings. Nor did it otherwise."
Would not this be true, a fortiori, in a case where there is no adverse
claim and cannot be any as to the pledged property?
It is hardly necessary to point out to anyone carefully examining the
opinions of the courts on this question the vital importance which the courts
attach, and which of necessity attaches, to the fact of possession. It is of
the very essence of the legal reasoning on the subject-the pivotal point
of the Courts' thought.
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This case, which is a decision of the District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, was cited in the presentation
of the case of In re Hudson River Nay. Corp., supra, to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit. Although Pennsylvania is not within the 2nd Circuit, what, in view of the fact
that it was cited to that Circuit Court of Appeals, can be said
of its standing as an authority? The said Circuit Court of Appeals, although having had the opportunity of considering all
the language of District Judge Dickinson, adopted just the opposite view on opposite reasoning.
Another case involving real estate is a ease of interest in
connection with this proposition. In In re Isaacs v. Hobbs,
supra, the Supreme Court considered the question of a conflict
of jurisdiction between courts if another rule than that therein
laid down should be established. In Allebach v. Thomas (1927)
(C. C. A. 4th Cir.), 16 F. 2d 853, in which the Supreme Court
refused certiorari (274 U. S. 744), the power of sale given in
mortgages or deeds of trust which are sanctioned by the laws
of some states was practically nullified upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition by or against the owner of the real estate. In
this case the Court said:
"The theory of the appellants and petitioners for review is
that they have been deprived by the action of the court of some
contractural right in respect to their debts and the security
taken for payment of the same. This, however, is an entire
misconception of the effect of the Bankruptcy Law which in
plain terms provides that the bankruptcy proceedings shall not
affect the validity of the lien; but it nowhere says that this
fact shall in any manner affect the remedy to enforce the lienor's
rights. The remedy may be altered without impairing the obligation of the contract so long as an equally adequate remedy is
afforded."
Without any desire to quibble over words it is perhaps
proper to call attention to the fact that Section 67d uses this
broad language: " . . . shall not be affected by the Act."
Standard dictionaries give as the meaning of the words "to
affect" the following: "to act upon; to produce an effect or
change upon." In any view of the rule of those cases which
deny to the pledgee the right to independently sell, the courts
so holding admit that he is given another remedy. This other
remedy, the right to petition the bankruptcy court or to sell
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through the bankruptcy court, is obviously a different thing
than is given the pledgee in and by the contract of pledge. Do
not these cases produce a change in the clear meaning and even
in the express language of the Act? Can it be said that they do

not affect the lien?
Can this distinction between the "right" of a pledgee of
collateral securities and his "remedy" relied upon in the opinions
above set out be justified? To take that position, it is submitted,
is to completely ignore the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Fuller

in Hiscock v. The Varick Bank, supra, who said: "The Bankrupt Act did not attempt by any of its provisions, to deprive a
lienor of any remedy which the law of the state vested him
with." It cannot well be said that the then Chief Justice did
not know what he was saying. In the report of the case it
is to be noted that this point was presented to the Court in the
brief filed by the appellee (the bank). Among other points
stated in that brief appears the following: "The Bankruptcy
Act does not attempt to deprive a lienor of any right or remedy
which the contract vests him with
.
." It is of considerable
significance that in none of the District Court cases considered,
in which the Courts have drawn this distinction, is this opinion
of the Supreme Court even cited. No attempt is made to distinguish or limit it. Is it too much to say that if a case involving the right of a pledgee of any kind of collateral security under discussion here were to reach the Supreme Court it would
be decided on the authority of Hiscock v. The Varick Bank?
Moreover, on principle, whether a distinction between "substantive rights" and "legal remedies" can be so easily, and even
lightly drawn is surely a question of some doubt. Where is the
line to be drawn? Is it not conceivable that the deprivation of
the right to sell is deprivation of a very substantial right-a
part of the security-part of the thing the lender of his money
bargained for and loaned his money in reliance on? Cannot the
language of the Court in In re Hudson River Nav. Corp., supra,
be said to be an actual statement of the factual situation? Does
not it contain a fair and accurate statement of what the parties
do? How many pledge agreements do not contain a power to
sell? Of what particular advantage is it to the pledgee to have
the pledged securities under his lock and key and nothing more?
Is it enough to say to a pledgee: "You have another remedy, the
Bankruptcy Court may permit you to sell"? Isn't the right to
sell, to exercise his dominion, upon the strength of which he
loans his money, of the very essence of the lien? And if this
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be true, that is, if the power of sale is a part of the pledge and
the lien thereof and not a mere cure, can a Bankruptcy Court
correctly say, as the District Court did in In re Hanry, supra,
"We have nothing to do with the doctrine of the inviolability of
contracts"'15 and isn't the power of sale as much as any other
part of the lien protected and preserved by Section 67d? The
only good purpose to be served by restraining the sale of collateral securities (the Court being under no duty or necessity to
protect its jurisdiction) would be to get a better price for the
securities in the interests of the general creditors. Of course,
where, after the filing of the petition and after receiving notice
of the sale, the trustee, if then appointed, or some creditor,
properly comes into a bankruptcy court and alleges fraud or
oppression or sets up an adverse claim going to the very validity of the pledge, the purpose of holding up the sale until
these questions could be determined might be served by an interference by the bankruptcy court with the sale. However,
the sale, if fraudulent or made without right, could always be
avoided. But as a matter of law and of legal reasoning, the
accomplishment of that purpose alone, namely, the obtaining
of a better price for the pledged collateral, is not justifiable.
As was said in In re Hudson River Navigation Corp., supra,
"Any misgivings on the part of the receiver or trustee in bankruptcy that the pledged securities may not bring as much as
the trustee or receiver hopes such securities may sometime
bring, or that they may even be sacrificed at the proposed sale,
is legally immaterial."16
15 Whether the construction of the Bankruptcy Act resulting in the restraining of sales of collateral securities impairs the obligation of a contract, and the cases concerning that particular phase of this general subject are not considered in this discussion. Numerous cases in which reference thereto is made could be cited. But the question of whether there is
a valid distinction with a real difference between the pledgee's " right" and
his "remedy" must first be answered in the negative before a detailed
consideration of constitutional questions is pertinent and lack of both time
and space does not now permit thereof. The magnitude of such a question, in a proper case, is obvious. In finally passing upon it, the Supreme
Court would be again confronted squarely with the question of whether
there is a distinction with a difference between a pledgee's right and his
remedy. It is suggested that that Court has already been presented with
and has passed upon that question, as to the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act now under consideration, in Hiscock v. The Varick Bank, supra, as
pointed out above.
16 In Hunter v. First National Bank (1908), 172 Ind. 62, 87 N. E. 734,
the Court said: "In the absence of some special agreement or action the
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What interests are to be served by the adoption of a rule
which would permit interference with such sales by the bankruptcy court? Is it reasonable to suppose that the bankruptcy
court and its officers are better able to judge of the value of the
securities and the proper time to sell them so that the greatest
amount of money can be realized upon them than is the pledgee
who loaned his money on his knowledge of their market and
their marketability? If the sale is to be had in the bankruptcy
proceeding itself, shouldn't it be considered that it is common
knowledge that buyers come to such sales hunting bargains and
very frequently find them? And, again, no one is harmed by
permitting the pledgee to enjoy his contractual right. The trustee is entitled'to any overplus realized from the sale and a
pledgee is held to a strict accountability therefor. The sale, if
a valid public sale, is as open to the trustee, the pledgor and
any interested creditor as to anyone else, and they can attend
and see what is done; and if the sale be private or at brokers'
boards, full information as to the price obtained and the details
of the transaction are always available to the trustee, the
pledgor and any interested creditor, who can satisfy themselves
that there was no fraud, oppression or injustice.
It is to be noted that with but a few exceptions, the principal ones of which have been set out above, all the cases in which
it is held that the pledgee may be restrained or otherwise interfered with, are cases of the realization upon real estate security requiring the aid of some court and its officers and that
these few exceptions are cases in which, while the sale of the
personal property is enjoined or interfered with by the bankruptcy court, the courts use real estate cases to support their
conclusions. Assuming the correctness of the rule arrived at in
holder of collateral securities is not obliged to watch the market and sell
at the highest price at his peril, but may remain wholly passive although
he may have notice of a probable decline or depreciation in the value of

such collaterals. (Cases cited.)"
In Crume v. Brightwell (1919), 69 Ind. App. 404, 122 N. E. 230, the
Court said: "It has been held that the holder of collateral security is
answerable for reasonable, but not extraordinary, diligence in its collection
and that a want of such diligence may be set up as a defense in an action
on a note for which such security is given. (Cases cited.) The paragraph
of answer under consideration does not allege any special duty on the part
of the holders of such collateral security with reference to its collection, nor

does it allege that there has been any failure on their part to use reasonable diligence to collect the same. It is, therefore, insufficient and the
Court did not err in sustaining the demurrer thereto."
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the real estate cases on their facts, cannot a different result be
reached in cases involving collateral securities if reasons of fairness, policy or practicality arising in whole or in part from the
nature of the property, the nature of the interest of the pledgee
in the same, the purpose and circumstances surrounding pledges
of such securities and the position and usage of such pledges in
the business world, would so urge? Is Judge Lindley correct
in saying, in his opinion in the Insull cases, supra: "No good
reason appears why there should be any difference in principle
in the power of the Court to restrain action by a court or party
from foreclosure of a lien upon realty without consent of court
and that to restrain sales of securities whose situs is within the
court's jurisdiction"?
As pointed out above, the foreclosure of a mortgage necessarily requires the aid of a Court in most jurisdictions. This
further consideration and the cases immediately following,
should also be noted. If the Supreme Court and other Federal
Courts are correct in holding that the unique jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court over the administration of the bankrupt's
property does not relate to the enforcement (see McHenry
v. LaSociete Francaise D'Epargues (1877), 95 U. S. 58; In
re San Gabriel Sanitorium Co., 111 Fed. 892 (C. C. A. 9th,
1911) ; In re Victor Color & Varnish Co., 175 Fed. 1023 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1909), but merely to the ascertainment (see U. S.
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Bray (1912), 225 U. S. 205, 56 L.
ed. 1055), of the validity of liens on property within the possession of the trustee, is it too much to say that Section 57h of
the Act, heretofore considered, expressly permits the sale of
collateral securities by a pledgee? The value of a mortgage
(unless, indeed, it is agreed upon) cannot be ascertained except with the aid of a court. The aid of the court is invoked
by a suit and by section Ila of the Bankruptcy Act (U.S.C.
Title 11, Sec. 29a), suits may be stayed. This is obviously correct. It is interesting and significant that no similar provision (i. e., similar to Section Ila) is found in the Act giving
the Bankruptcy Court power or authority to restrain the exercise by a pledgee of the dominion he has over the pledged securities. To repeat, in the case of a mortgage, not only is the aid
of some court required to acquire that dominion, but in most
cases to obtain the possession upon which that .dominion is
founded. No such necessity exists in the situation considered
in this discussion.
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It is submitted that it is unfair to assume that the general
rule is that the enforcement of all liens, except with the consent of the bankruptcy court, can be restrained, and therefore to
say or imply that if a different rule is to be followed as to collateral securities it would constitute an exception thereto. Whatever one's opinion as to the result that should be reached, surely
the case of collateral securities can stand on its own bottom on
principle, and should not be stigmatized in the eyes of the law
as an "exception." That there is properly a distinction with a
difference between the case of real estate mortgages and cases
of personal property collateral held by a pledgee is conceded
in one of the leading real estate cases holding to the rule that
suits to foreclose mortgages may be interfered with. In In re
Jersey Island Packing Co. (1905) (C. 0. A. 9th), 138 Fed. 625,
in which case the foreclosure of a mortgage was restrained, the
Court said:
"The petitioners also cite In re Brown (D. C. 104 Fed. 762).17
In that case McPherson, District Judge, while declining to pass
on the question whether the court had jurisdiction to interfere
and prevent a fraudulent or oppressive exercise of the right of
17 The opinion of the Court in this case seems so clear that it is set out
in full. The Court said:
"Certain creditors of these bankrupts hold promissory notes for a large
amount, secured by the pledge of wool; the notes being in the ordinary collateral form, and giving the creditors power to sell at public or private
sale without previous demand or notice. The receivers aver that the power
of sale is about to be exercised, and that the bankrupts' equity in the
pledged property will probably be sacrificed unless the court intervenes,
and so controls the exercise of the power that the receivers are given an
opportunity to obtain purchasers for the wool at a full and fair value. The
petition asks for an order forbidding the creditors to sell until after, say,
10 days' notice to the receivers that a sale is intended. A temporary
restraining order was issued, forbidding a sale under any circumstances,
and it is now to be determined whether the court has the power to make
the order prayed for, or any other order interfering with the creditors'
right to sell.
"I do not pass upon the question, whether the court may interfere to
prevent a fraudulent or oppressive exercise of such a right. No such exercise is threatened in the present case. It is agreed that the creditors intend
to deal fairly with the property pledged, and will make an honest effort
to sell for the best prices that can be obtained. This being so, I am of
opinion that the bankrupt act gives the court no authority to intervene between these creditors and their exercise of the right to sell given by the collateral notes. Each of these creditors has a lien, which I must assume, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, was given and accepted in good
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sale of personal property which had been pledged by the bankrupt more than four months prior to bankruptcy, in a case
where it had been agreed that the creditors intended to deal
fairly with the property pledged, and to make an honest effort
to sell for the best prices that could be obtained, was of the
opinion that the Bankruptcy Act gave the court no authority
to interfere between the creditors and the exercise of their right
to sell given them by the collateral notes. It may be remarked
in this connection that the interest of a pledgee differs from
that of a mortgagee. The pledgee has a special interest in the
thing pledged which entitles him to the possession, to protect
which he may maintain detinue, replevin or trover, and the interest of the pledgor is not subject to execution. The decision
in In re Brown may be accepted as authority for the proposition that a District Court will not interfere with a sale by a
pledgee of the thing pledged, under the power of sale given by
the terms of his contract when there is no claim that such power
is exercised in a fraudulent or oppressive manner."
What may be regarded as more than an intimation that such
might be the holding in the Seventh Circuit is given by that
faith for a present consideration, and not in contemplation of, or in fraud
upon, the statute; and such liens are declared by clause 'd' of Section 67 to
be unaffected by the act. The phrase 'unaffected by the act' may perhaps
be too broad. Other sections do affect such liens in some respects not now
material, but the general meaning of the phrase is clear. Such liens are
left as the act finds them, and (passing the question whether the court
may interfere in the case of a fraudulent or oppressive enforcement) they
may be proceeded upon according to their terms.
"It was argued that clause 'h' of Section 57 gives the necessary power
to restrain and regulate the creditors' right to sell. The material part of
that clause is as follows:
'The value of securities held by secured creditors shall be determined by
converting the same into money according to the terms of the agreement
pursuant to which such securities were delivered to such creditors, or by
such creditors and the trustee, by agreement, arbitration, compromise, or
litigation, as the court may direct. . ..
"Assuming that this clause intends to do something more than provide
for a method of determining the value of securities held by secured creditors, if such creditors desire to ascertain and to prove a possibly unsecured
balance of their claims, I cannot avoid the conclusion that the court is only
permitted to intervene when the agreement between the bankrupt and the
creditor fails to provide a method by which the value of the securities may
be ascertained-again reserving the question of the court's power in the
case of a fraudulent or oppressive conversion. This clause seems to me to
be explicit. The value of such securities is to be ascertained 'by converting
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Circuit Court of Appeals in Guaranty Trust Co. v. Fentress, et
al. (Oct. 17, 1932), supra. While the case went off on the question of jurisdiction of the pledged property, the Court said:
"As to the merits of the question it is obvious that the rights
of the receivers can be no greater than those of their predecessors in title, the pledgors. The pledgors had neither possession of the stock nor the right to possession. While the exact details of the pledges are not set forth, the Court will not
presume invalidity of the pledges, in favor of appellees, upon
whom rested the burden of alleging and proving facts which
justified the entry of the injunctional orders.' s Rather must
we assume that the pledges were of such character as to give
the pledgees such right of possession, ownership and disposition as was necessary to effect the object of the transfers. A
pledge ordinarily implies a delivery of the personal property
pledged, for the purpose, if necessary, of its sale to protect
the pledgee against loss in case of the default of the pledgor.
In most cases and in this case in particular the pledges were
accompanied by delivery of the certificate and transfers of them
to the pledgees."
the same into money according to the terms of the agreement pursuant to
which such securities were delivered to such creditors.' If there be no such
agreement, the clause then goes on to say that the value is to be ascertained
'by such creditors and the trustee, by agreement, arbitration, compromise
or litigation, as the court may direct' The supervision of the court is thus
confined to the ascertainment of value where the bankrupt and his creditor
have themselves failed to deal with this subject. In such an event the
court may direct how the value is to be ascertained, and may choose among
the methods of 'agreement, arbitration, compromise or litigation,' supervising and controlling either form of proceeding.
"Clause 7 of Section 2, giving the court power to 'cause the assets of
bankrupts to be collected, reduced to money and distributed, and determine
controversies in relation thereto, except as herein otherwise provided,' and
clause 15 of the same section, giving power to 'make such orders, issue
such process and enter such judgments, in addition to those specifically
provided for, as may be necessary for the enforcement of the provisions
of this act,' must, of course, be read in connection with the rest of the statute, and are necessarily qualified by such provisions as are to be found in
clause 'd' of Section 67, concerning liens, and by clause 'h' of Section 57,
concerning the method of ascertaining the value of securities held by
creditors.
"In each case the restraining order is now dissolved, and the petition
of the receivers is refused."
18 Query, whether this language does not inferentially say that facts
showing invalidity in the pledge itself must be alleged and proved?
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The Court no doubt uses the word "ownership" advisedly.
Query, in view of what is set out above in this discussion,
whether it is necessary to go that far. It is to be recalled that
in the opinion of District Judge Lindley he had said:
"It is sometimes said that the pledgee receives legal title by
virtue of the pledge. However, it is apparent that such so-called
title is one of personal property and subject. to defeasance (if
such term be properly applicable to personal property), and
terminates upon compliance with the condition of such defeasance, namely, payment of the loan. There is, therefore, an interest in the pledge that may be divested only by foreclosure
sale. Such situation in principle does not differ from that of
a mortgagee upon real property, in possession of the mortgaged
property, whose title is subject to defeasance by payment and
may be perfected as against the mortgagor's interest only by
sale after notice or by foreclosure of the mortgage. A difference between the remedies of the mortgagee and those of the
pledgee exists when foreclosure is by the terms of the mortgage
or by law limited to a court foreclosure. It has never been understood that complete title in its full sense passes under either
form of lien. Thus in Harris v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 338
Ill. 245, 170 N. E. 286, the Court said: 'Possession by a pledgee
of certificates of stock endorsed in blank, when held for the purpose of security or pledged for a loan, does not vest the legal
title to the stock in the pledgee, but gives him a special property right in the thing pledged. The general property or title
in the stock remains in the pledgor, subject to the right of the
pledgee, until the pledge is foreclosed in accordance with the
terms of the pledge agreement or discharged. This has long
been the rule in Illinois.'"19
19 In Baxter v. Moore (1914), 56 Ind. App. 472, 105 N. E. 588, the

Court said:
As endorsee of the notes, although pledged as collateral, appellee had

the legal title to them. (Cases cited.) But if it should be said that Trook,
as such pledgor, still retained his interest in the notes, in that such possible excess belonged beneficially to him, and that, therefore, while appellee
held the legal title to the notes he was not in effect the owner thereof, then
it may also be said that such conclusion resulting from such argument
becomes material, if at all, only on the assumption that the allegation of
ownership contained in the complaint is well pleaded. We have shown that
such assumption cannot be entertained, but treating it as otherwise then
it does not follow, by any means, that the term 'owner' is equivalent to the
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While much more could be said, the language of the cases
above quoted states about all that need be said relative to the
nature of the interest of the pledgee in the pledged securities.
To show that question's importance and influence in any consideration of this whole matter the reasoning of In re Hudson
River Navigation Corp., supra, seems to be sound and as the
Court says in that case, "It seems unnecessary to refine too
far." A consideration of the nature of the pledgee's interest
may be, as the Court said in In re Henry, supra, "provocative
of a discussion that has no end."
IN CONCLUSION
Involving as it does, (a) a construction of the Bankruptcy
Act, (b) an attempt to arrive at an intelligent understanding,
by necessary interpretation, of the reasoning of the conflicting
decisions, and (c) a consideration of large questions of public
policy and the weighing of vital interests of the business world,
the problem is one which could perhaps be considered in greater
detail. Perhaps enough has been pointed out above, however,
to state the present condition of the law and to indicate the
great importance of the question and the uncertainty as to
what its ultimate solution may be. In the meantime and until
a final pronouncement has been made by the Supreme Court, the
profession will have to do the best it can in the conference room
and the District and Circuit Courts in which they may find
themselves.
But may it not be said upon an impartial analysis and review,
having in mind all three of these considerations, that the authorities, the better reasoning and the sounder principles support the position that where no fraud or oppression is shown or
asserted (and certainly in a case where none can be asserted),
a pledgee may independently and without seeking the permission or obtaining the consent of the bankruptcy court sell the
collateral securities so long as he does so pursuant to the conterm 'absolute owner.' Thus it is said that the word 'owner' is not a technical term. It is not confined to a person who has the absolute right in
a chattel. It also applies to a person who has the possession and control
of it.. . . It has been applied to a person in possession of personal
property, under a contract of hiring, since he has a special property in
the thing hired.
. . It does not necessarily imply exclusive or absolute ownership. . . . It is, therefore, apparent that the term 'owner'
is consistent with the sort of title held by the pledgee of collateral."
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tract or agreement of pledge and in strict conformity to its

terms?
Broad though the language of Mr. Justice Roberts in In re
Isaacs v. Hobbs, supra, may be said by some to be 2° isn't the
ratio decidendi of the case to be found in the statement of the
Court that "such injunctions are granted solely for the reason
that the Court in which foreclosure proceedings are pending is
without jurisdiction, after adjudication of bankruptcy, to deal
with the land or liens upon it save by the consent of the bankruptcy court," and isn't -iscock v. The Varick Bank, supra, the
law on the question we have been discussing? Can the cases,
holding contra, decided in the other Federal Courts since that
pronouncement of the Supreme Court of the United States in
1907, especially since they do not even refer to that decision,
be justified? So far as has been found at the present time and
down through the last volume of the Federal Reporter, all o
the cases holding that the consent of the bankruptcy court is
necessary before the sale of the pledged property by the pledgee,
or permitting the interference with such sales, are cases relating to liens asserted in the physical property admittedly in the
possession of the bankruptcy courts (or their officers), or to
which the officers of the bankruptcy court, standing in the shoes
20 The opinion contains this language: "Upon adjudication title to the
bankrupt's property vests in the trustee with actual or constructive possession and is placed in the custody of the bankruptcy court. Mueller v.
Nugent, 184 U. S. 1, . . . the title and right to possession of all the
property owned or possessed by the bankrupt vests in the trustee as of the
date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, no matter whether situated
within or without the District in which the Court sits."
If and when the case presenting squarely the right of a pledgee to sell,
without obtaining the consent of and without being interfered with by, a
court of bankruptcy, collateral securities of the kind considered in this
discussion again reaches the Supreme Court, will not that tribunal simply
say that the pledgor not only did not possess them but also was not the
owner of them (except to the extent of his beneficial interest in the overplus resulting from the sale) ?
Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U. S. 1, 46 L. ed. 405, simply holds that money
which the bankrupt owes third parties and had delivered to one William T.
Nugent as his agent, was in the hands of the bankrupt himself inasmuch
as it was in the hands of his agent or bailee, and inasmuch as the possession of the agent or bailee is that of his principal, the bankruptcy court had
power in a summary proceeding to compel its surrender to a trustee in
bankruptcy. This is, of course, the well established law. No adverse claim
of any kind was in any way asserted to the property by any one, to say
nothing of a pledgee thereof.
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of the bankrupt pledgor, had the immediate right to possession.
The only recent cases which may be said to be exceptions to
this statement are (1) In re Henry, which seems to be out of
line with all the other cases and authorities on the subject and
apparently is both discredited as an authority by In re Hudson
River Navigation Corp., supra, as pointed out above, and in
conflict with Hiscock v. The Varick Bank, supra, and (2) In
re Purkett-Douglas Co., supra, which, as elsewhere pointed out,
is a case dealing with the validity of the pledge. If a serious attempt should be made by a Court or party to distinguish Hiscock v. The Varick Bank from any case involving any of the
kinds of collateral security considered here, on the ground that
the case dealt with insurance policies only and for that reason
would not apply to a case involving, let us say, stocks or bonds,
would such an attempted distinction be countenanced? And
if the decision of the Supreme Court be correct on this subject
when insurance policies are the subject matter of the litigation,
then, a fortiori, would it not be so where the property involved
is those more common forms of securities which are always in
the possession and under the "dominion" of the pledgee and in
dealing with which there would seem to be even stronger reasons, on a balance of the interests in a fair scale, for the pledgee
to have and enjoy unmolested the right he bargained for and
expected to get when he loaned his money.

